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May 09, 2006 
 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 
 
My name is Ronald A. Pearlman. I am a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University 
Law Center, where I teach courses in Federal income taxation. 
 
It is a great privilege to appear before the Subcommittee today. I appear on my own 
behalf. My comments represent my personal views and not necessarily those of 
Georgetown University or any other organization with whom I am associated.  
 
I have appeared before the Subcommittee on two prior occasions to address issues 
relating to corporate tax reform. In 1983, as a representative of the Treasury Department, 
I discussed problems with the carryover of corporate net operating losses and other tax 
attributes, and in 1985, I discussed factors relating to the then-current wave of corporate 
mergers. Today, I would like to comment on two tax reform topics that, at least on the 
surface, appear to be quite different than the subjects of my prior testimony. 
 
Business Tax Preferences 
 
The first topic that I wish to address involves the recurring question whether Congress 
should provide tax relief to corporate taxpayers, by which I mean to include all business 
taxpayers regardless of their form of organization, through targeted tax preferences or by 
means of periodic reductions in the corporate tax rate. 
 
My instinct, informed by 27 years of experience as a practicing tax lawyer advising 
clients in many different industries, and ranging in size from small closely-held 
businesses to large multinational corporations, and by 10 years of assorted tax- related 
government service, is that corporate tax rate reduction most often is preferable to the 
enactment of industry-specific or activity-specific tax preferences. Put another way, I 
think the legislative default policy should be to eliminate tax preferences and lower 
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corporate tax rates. 
 
In May 1985, President Reagan transmitted to the Congress the recommendations that 
served as the impetus for enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The summary of 
President Reagan's proposals stated, "The tax system should, insofar as possible, foster 
economic growth by . . . allowing resources to be allocated efficiently on the basis of 
economic rather than tax considerations." In furtherance of this efficiency objective, the 
Report went onto say, "Special subsidies or preferences for specific industries or sectors 
should be curtailed except where there is a clear national security interest that argues to 
the contrary." 
 
Why was efficiency so important to President Reagan? I think it was because he 
understood that by altering incentives, an industry-specific or an activity-specific tax 
preference will cause business taxpayers to disregard market forces -- or at least alter the 
influence of market competition on their decisions -- thereby adversely affecting the 
allocation of resources of the particular business and of the Nation. 
 
Not only is a distortion in the business decision making process likely to impose costs on 
the economy, it also tilts the playing field in favor of one group of businesses over 
another. The financial advantage of a narrow tax preference may influence how third 
parties -- lenders and equity investors, for example -- evaluate competing businesses. The 
tax preference thereby may create an inappropriate advantage in the marketplace that 
discourages entrepreneurs in emerging industries or technologies who do not enjoy a 
comparable tax advantage from successfully competing for capital, thereby stifling U.S. 
economic growth. 
 
While I admit to a bias in favor of President Reagan's approach to tax reform because of 
my involvement in the development of the Administration's proposals and my advocacy 
for their enactment before the Ways and Means Committee, I think our tax system would 
be much improved if the tax law today more fully reflected his philosophy. However, one 
does not have to accept a market efficiency analysis to question the appropriateness of 
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narrow business tax preferences. 
 
We might tolerate the economic distortion resulting from a particular preference if we 
could be reasonably certain that it produces a sufficient quantity of the desired behavior 
over and above the behavior that would occur absent the existence of the preference. To 
the extent a tax preference provides a tax subsidy for behavior that would occur anyway, 
the subsidy is a waste of money that could be expended more productively on new or 
existing programs, to reduce the deficit, or to provide broad-based tax relief. 
 
Unfortunately, our collective knowledge of the effectiveness of targeted tax preferences 
is not well developed. Recently, the Director of Strategic Issues for the Government 
Accountability Office was reported to have bemoaned the lack of research on the true 
effect of tax incentives. Supporters of a tax preference typically point to an assortment of 
ad hoc examples of the positive impact of the preference and to self-serving supportive 
assertions by executives about the incentive effect. In the absence of a body of unbiased 
research regarding the effectiveness of tax preferences or a negative analysis by 
opponents of a particular preference, Members of Congress, under the pressure of the tax 
legislative process, understandably tend to accept supportive information as a validation 
of the preference's effectiveness. 
 
The U.S. business tax system is replete with targeted tax preferences. Some are narrowly 
targeted, some more broadly. However, in every case, one class of business taxpayers is 
preferred over another. In the aggregate, the revenue effects of these preferences are 
substantial. Take for example a small group of tax credits: the credit for increasing 
research activities, popularly known as the research and development or "R&D" tax 
credit (Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code); the low-income housing credit (S. 42); 
the renewable electricity production credit (S. 45); and the nonconventional source fuel 
credit, more commonly referred to as the Section 29 credit even though the section 
reference is out of date (S. 45K). Assuming extension of the R&D credit, the combined 
projected revenue effect of these four credits for a single year (F/Y 2007) is 
approximately $13.7 billion, and the five-year effect is approximately $81.6 billion. 
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Why would it not be appropriate to compare the potential economic effects of retaining 
the credits or alternatively financing a reduction in the corporate tax rate with the 
revenues generated by repeal of the credits? I am not so naive to assume that there is any 
realistic chance repeal will occur. Nevertheless, supporters of existing, as well as 
proposed, business tax preferences should be forced to justify why the alternative of a 
corporate rate reduction is not in the best interests of U.S. tax and economic policy. This 
Subcommittee is an ideal venue for carefully considering the continuing utility of these 
and other tax preferences. To those who say that $13.7 billion is not sufficient revenue to 
effect a meaningful reduction in the corporate tax rate, I am confident that in response to 
the Subcommittee's request, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation will provide a 
list of additional repeal candidates that would finance meaningful corporate tax rate 
reduction. 
 
There are two occasions in the tax legislative process when advocates of existing tax 
preferences may realistically be pressured to justify continuation of their preferences. 
One arises when Congress needs to increase tax revenues to reduce the deficit or offset 
other tax reductions. The other is when Congress undertakes a comprehensive review of 
present law in connection with broad-based tax reform. In anticipation of any corporate 
tax reform project in the Ways and Means Committee, I encourage the Subcommittee to 
seek the assistance of the Joint Committee on Taxation, the Congressional Budget Office, 
the Congressional Research Service, and General Accountability Office, as well as 
academic and private sector analysts, in carefully and, might I suggest boldly, 
reevaluating the appropriateness of existing business tax preferences. This exercise will 
not, and probably should not, result in the repeal of all of them. However, with Member 
support, it should serve to identify those provisions that no longer can be justified and 
assist in improving the effectiveness of those provisions that remain in the law. 
 
Deductibility of Business Interest 
 
The second topic that I wish to discuss relates to the deductibility of interest expense on 
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debt incurred by business taxpayers to finance the purchase of capital investment, 
including not only real and tangible property (plant, machinery and equipment), but also 
intangible property, such as patents, copyrights, and know-how. 
 
One important reason to consider the relevance of the deductibility of interest expense in 
the context of corporate tax reform relates to the problems under present law that result 
from characterization of corporate investment as debt or equity. However, I am motivated 
to discuss business interest expense today for a different reason, namely, because of the 
relationship between the deductibility of interest expense and the tax law cost recovery 
rules relating to debt-financed investments that I assume will be an important part of any 
corporate tax reform debate. 
 
"Cost recovery" refers to mechanisms by which a business taxpayer is entitled to reduce 
or offset otherwise taxable income by its investment in a business asset. Depreciation is 
an important form of cost recovery, as is the right of a taxpayer to offset its undepreciated 
investment, referred to as the asset's adjusted tax basis, against the consideration the 
taxpayer receives on the sale or other disposition of a business asset in calculating the 
gain or loss on the disposition. Other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that might 
not appear to be cost recovery mechanisms are best analyzed as if they were. In 
particular, certain business tax credits, such as the R&D credit and the low-income 
housing tax credit, are calculated as a percentage of a taxpayer's relevant expenditures 
and, therefore, afford the taxpayer an added means of recovering a portion of its 
investment in property associated with the tax-preferred activity. 
 
A pure, or idealized, income tax subjects a business taxpayer to tax on its (net) economic 
income. In theory, a properly designed depreciation system under a pure income tax, 
known as "economic depreciation," would enable a business taxpayer to recover its cost 
in a business asset by properly matching periodic depreciation deductions with income 
generated by the asset during the same period. Depreciation deductions would be 
calculated based on the economic useful life of the asset (that is, the period over which 
the asset is expected to be productive) and the actual decline in value of the asset in each 
 7 
period.To properly calculate the taxpayer's economic income, it also is appropriate under 
a pure income tax to allow the taxpayer to deduct interest expense related to debt incurred 
to finance the purchase of the asset, because the interest expense is an added cost of 
earning the income generated by the asset. 
 
Under a pure consumption tax that is calculated by reference to sales or other income of a 
business (a cash-flow consumption tax; a subtraction-method value-added tax, such as the 
so-called Flat Tax or the Bradford X Tax; or an invoice-credit form of value- added tax), 
the cost of capital investments would be fully recovered at the time incurred either 
through a deduction equal to 100 percent of the asset's cost or, in the case of an invoice- 
credit value added tax, by means of a credit for prior taxes paid. 
 
Unlike a pure income tax, a consumption tax exempts income from capital from tax. This 
exemption is implemented at the business level of a consumption tax by allowing 
business taxpayers to fully deduct the cost of a capital investment when incurred, a cost 
recovery mechanism known as "expensing." The effect of expensing is to exempt the 
income generated by the business asset from tax on a present value basis, assuming a 
constant rate of return and constant tax rates. This is so even if it appears that income 
generated by the asset is taxable because the taxpayer makes nominal tax payments to the 
government over the productive life of the asset. This analysis is know as the "immediate 
deduction-yield exemption equivalence" and is based on work postulated in 1942 by an 
economist named E. Cary Brown." 
 
Because income from business assets is deemed to be exempt from tax under a 
consumption tax by reason of the expensing of capital investment, it is inappropriate to 
also permit the business taxpayer to deduct interest expense on debt incurred to finance 
the purchase or development of the expensed asset. To do so would create a negative tax 
that would provide an improper government subsidy to the taxpayer. Consistent with this 
analysis, the Growth and Investment Tax Plan recently proposed by the President's Tax 
Reform Advisory Panel would allow immediate expensing of all new business 
investment, but also would eliminate the deductibility of business interest. The Panel's 
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Report describes the proposal to deny the deduction of business interest as "an essential 
component" of the Plan. "Allowing both expensing of new investments and an interest 
deduction would result in a net tax subsidy to new investment. Projects that would not be 
economical in a no-tax world might become viable just because of the tax subsidy. This 
would result in economic distortions and adversely impact economic activity." 
 
Present law is not a pure income tax but, rather, a hybrid tax system that has both income 
tax and consumption tax characteristics. I will be surprised if a fundamental reform of 
present law will result in a new tax law that one could describe as "pure." It is for this 
reason that I chose to raise the interest expense issue in my comments today. 
 
We have seen a trend in U.S. tax policy toward liberalized cost recovery. Depreciation 
under present law is accelerated, that is, it is faster than economic depreciation, and in 
some instances, the statute provides for immediate expensing of capital investment, a 
prominent example being the so-called small business expensing (S. 179). Consumption 
tax proponents understandably identify expensing as a key element of any reform of the 
current tax system, and I would expect expensing or some form of accelerated 
depreciation would be considered as part of a reform of the business tax system. 
 
I am concerned that in the legislative sausage factory, expensing will be perceived as an 
attractive component of a business tax package but the disallowance of interest expense 
will not, leading to the possible enactment of the tax subsidy to which the President's 
Panel referred. This subsidy will encourage a variety of tax shelters and other tax-
motivated activities that will pose a very significant threat to the tax base. 
 
If we could be certain that the interest income paid by business taxpayers would be 
subject to tax in the hands of the recipients, the revenue effect of the continued 
deductibility of interest expense would be of less concern, even though the distortive 
effects to which the President's Panel refers would continue to be troubling. However, we 
know that a sizeable portion of interest income is exempt from U.S. tax because corporate 
debt is owned by so-called tax-indifferent parties, including foreign lenders that are not 
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subject to U.S. tax. In 1989, the Joint Committee on Taxation reported that, based on 
1987 data, foreign investors owned 13.3 percent of U.S. corporate bonds and an 
additional 62.2 percent were owned by insurance companies and pension funds, resulting 
in the current exemption from tax of a sizeable portion of the interest income received on 
corporate debt in their portfolios. I presume the percentages reported in 1989 are larger 
today. 
 
The relationship between expensing and the deductibility of business interest expense, in 
my view, is a very significant issue. If I am correct, it will be important for the 
Subcommittee to analyze specific cost recovery proposals with this issue in mind. 
 
As a final point, it is worth noting that the subsidy to which the President's Tax Reform 
Panel referred exists under present law, because interest expense frequently is incurred in 
connection with debt-financed business investments that are eligible for accelerated 
depreciation or expensing under Section 179. Thus, the tax treatment of business interest 




At the beginning of my remarks, I mentioned that I had previously appeared before the 
Subcommittee to comment on two corporate tax reform topics, the transferability of 
corporate tax attributes and corporate mergers and acquisitions. References to those two 
previous appearances might seem merely evidence of my nostalgia, having no relevance 
to my comments today. I do value my interactions with the Subcommittee over the years, 
but I also I think the prior appearances to which I referred are relevant. 
 
To the extent the tax law creates distortions, as do industry- specific or activity-specific 
tax preferences, and to the extent the tax law creates discontinuities, as does the 
deductibility of interest by a business taxpayer who is entitled to recover the cost of a 
capital investment faster that economic depreciation, there exist increased incentives to 
structure transactions to enable business taxpayers that do not have sufficient income to 
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fully use the tax preferences or interest deductions to directly or indirectly transfer those 
preferences to another taxpayer who can use them to reduce its tax liability or to merge 
with another business taxpayer that is able to use the tax benefit. As the Subcommittee 
considers corporate tax reform proposals, I encourage you to keep in mind the possible 
implications of these distortions and discontinuities. 
 
Thank you very much. I will be pleased to attempt to answer any questions. 
